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Abstract:  
 
One’s memory for past test performance (MPT) is a key piece of information individuals use 
when deciding how to restudy material. We used a multi-trial recognition memory task to 
examine adult age differences in the influence of MPT (measured by actual Trial 1 memory 
accuracy and subjective confidence judgments, CJs) along with Trial 1 judgments of learning 
(JOLs), objective and participant-estimated recognition fluencies, and Trial 2 study time on Trial 
2 JOLs. We found evidence of simultaneous and independent influences of multiple objective 
and subjective (i.e., metacognitive) cues on Trial 2 JOLs, and these relationships were highly 
similar for younger and older adults. Individual differences in Trial 1 recognition accuracy and 
CJs on Trial 2 JOLs indicate that individuals may vary in the degree to which they rely on each 
MPT cue when assessing subsequent memory confidence. Aging appears to spare the ability to 
access multiple cues when making JOLs. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
During the course of learning, people are often able to study materials multiple times (e.g., when 
a student spends multiple nights studying for an exam). Actively monitoring one’s current state 
of learning can help to optimize further study efforts (e.g., Nelson & Narens, 1990; see Bjork, 
Dunlosky, & Kornell, 2013 for a recent review of self-regulated learning). One metric for 
assessing an individual’s perceptions of his or her current state of learning is the judgment of 
learning (JOL), for which people rate confidence in the likelihood of remembering a piece of 
information (e.g., an item from a word list) during a subsequent memory test (for an introductory 
overview, see Dunlosky & Metcalfe, 2009). As reviewed in detail below, research on aging and 
JOLs indicates age-related invariance in the relative accuracy of JOLs, as indicated by within-
person correlations of item JOLs with memory outcomes such as item recall success (Hertzog & 
Dunlosky, 2011). The present study focuses on age differences in the information people use to 
make JOLs and whether the cues that are accessed differ across the adult lifespan (Hertzog & 
Shing, 2011). Before reviewing the literature on aging and JOLs, we first consider theories of 
JOL construction that set the stage for understanding age differences in how people use multiple 
cues to construct JOLs. 
 
Cue utilization and JOLs 
 
It is widely accepted that metacognitive judgments are explicit or implicit inferences based on 
accessible information, or cues, about underlying cognitive states without direct access to those 
internal cognitive states (Koriat, 1997) ; Nelson, 1996a) There are many potential metacognitive 
cues available to individuals, which differ widely in their validity for predicting later 
remembering (Dunlosky & Metcalfe, 2009). 
 
Research over the last 25 years has identified a large number of cues that are accessed when 
making JOLs, including initial encoding fluency (e.g., Begg, Duft, Lalonde, Melnick, & Sanvito, 
1989; Besken & Mulligan, 2013; Hertzog, Dunlosky, Robinson, & Kidder, 2003; Undorf & 
Erdfelder, 2013); retrieval fluency (e.g., Benjamin, Bjork, & Schwartz, 1998; Hines, Touron, & 
Hertzog, 2009); perceived item difficulty (Undorf & Erdfelder, 2013); learners’ degree of prior 
familiarity with to-be-learned items (e.g., Shanks & Serra, 2014); how JOLs are framed (e.g., 
whether prediction instructions focus on studying or forgetting; Ariel, Hines, & Hertzog, 2014; 
Finn, 2008); spontaneous use of effective encoding strategies (Hertzog, Sinclair, & Dunlosky, 
2010); and, perhaps most commonly, observable item characteristics such as associative 
relatedness or word concreteness (e.g., Begg et al., 1989; Hertzog, Kidder, Powell-Moman, & 
Dunlosky, 2002; Koriat, 1997; Rhodes & Castel, 2008). 
 
An open question at present is how many cues individuals can access on a given item, or across a 
set of items. Most of the existing literature has focused on either one or a small set of potential 
cues. A multiple-cue utilization perspective (Hertzog, Hines, & Touron, 2013) argues that people 
can and do access and use multiple cues when making JOLs, although the likelihood of accessing 
multiple cues during the judgment process will be influenced by factors such as motivation, 
ability, fatigue, item difficulty, and the capacity of attention and working memory. Certainly, not 
all available cues are accessed and used when making JOLs. Learners have been found to ignore, 
neglect, or discount many cues that are highly diagnostic of later remembering, such as an 
asymmetric direction of associative relatedness of cue–target word pairs (e.g., Koriat & Bjork, 
2006) or variation in the effectiveness of instructed encoding strategies (e.g., Hertzog et al., 
2009). In some cases, cue-neglect may be associated with overshadowing of one cue by another 
(e.g., Hertzog et al., 2002). 
 
An important JOL cue in multi-trial learning tasks (involving more than one study–test trial) is 
memory-for-past-test performance (MPT; Ariel & Dunlosky, 2011; Finn & Metcalfe, 2007, 
2008; Hertzog et al., 2013; Serra & Ariel, 2014; Tauber & Rhodes, 2012). JOLs made after the 
first test are typically strongly related to MPT, which has been argued to seed an MPT heuristic 
(“if I remembered it before, I’ll remember it again”; Finn & Metcalfe, 2007). Individuals could 
improve JOL accuracy (or resolution) across study– test trials by solely relying on an MPT 
heuristic, perhaps at the cost of ignoring other valid cues while generating an underconfidence-
with-practice effect, in which JOL magnitudes increasingly underestimate future performance by 
ignoring future learning (Finn & Metcalfe, 2008). Other cues aside from MPT apparently 
influence multi-trial JOLs (Ariel & Dunlosky, 2011; Tauber & Rhodes, 2012), although the 
specific cues responsible for the effects reported in those studies were not identified. 
 
Hertzog et al. (2013) used multilevel modeling procedures (Snijders & Bosker, 2012) to show 
explicitly that encoding fluency was a source of enhanced JOL–memory correlations at a second 
study trial, in addition to other cues. As expected from the MPT literature studying associative 
cued recall, Trial 2 JOLs were strongly influenced by prior recognition memory accuracy or 
success (the index of MPT). The additional cues influencing JOLs included: (a) item-level 
recognition confidence judgments (CJs); (b) actual recognition response latency; (c) subjective 
recognition test fluency (measured by recognition response times, RTs); and (d) encoding 
fluency (measured by strategy completion RTs) immediately prior to the JOL. 
 
CJs in associative recognition tests are influenced by retrieval fluency and accuracy (Hines et al., 
2009), while diverging from both due to fallible metacognitive monitoring. For example, factors 
like specific recollections of study or retrieval strategies (and their degree of success) or the 
general degree of clarity regarding those recollections may influence memory confidence in 
associative recognition tests (e.g., Cohn & Moscovitch, 2007; Parks, 2007). In recognition 
memory contexts, the less-than-perfect accuracy of CJs, as measured by CJ–recognition memory 
success correlations, allows for detecting influences of both variables on JOLs. 
 
The role of actual retrieval fluency (correct recognition RTs) in influencing CJs and subsequent 
JOLs is not surprising, given that RTs are typically faster as one’s level of underlying item-
learning increases (e.g., Cerella, Onyper, & Hoyer, 2006; Logan, 1988; Ratcliff, Thapar, & 
McKoon, 2011). Monitoring this relationship may lead individuals to adopt a fluency heuristic 
(“if I remembered it quickly, I remembered it accurately”; e.g., Benjamin et al., 1998), which 
may provide useful information in addition to the MPT heuristic when constructing JOLs. The 
concurrent and independent influence of subjective retrieval fluency (as measured by estimated 
recognition RTs) controlling on actual RTs, might be more unexpected, given a literature that 
generally focuses on metacognition for memory response accuracy but not for response latency. 
 
As with CJs and recognition accuracy, the relation of prior test-trial subjective retrieval fluency 
on later JOLs probably arises because temporal monitoring in memory tasks are not always well 
calibrated, instead showing a substantial level of aggregate underestimation of RTs and trial-
level divergence between actual and estimated RT (Craik & Hay, 1999; Hertzog, Touron, & 
Hines, 2007). The influence of prior-trial CJs and estimated retrieval latencies on JOLs, 
controlling on recognition accuracy and actual recognition RTs, demonstrates the importance of 
metacognitive monitoring of past events on subsequent JOLs and study time (e.g., Hines et al., 
2009; Robinson, Hertzog, & Dunlosky, 2006). 
 
Age differences in JOL construction 
 
It is widely accepted that metacognitive judgments are explicit or implicit inferences based on 
accessible information, or cues, about underlying cognitive states without direct access to those 
internal cognitive states (Koriat, 1997; Nelson, 1996a). There are many potential metacognitive 
cues available to individuals, which differ widely in their validity for predicting later 
remembering (Dunlosky & Metcalfe, 2009). 
 
Research over the last 25 years has identified a large number of cues that are accessed when 
making JOLs, including initial encoding fluency (e.g., Begg, Duft, Lalonde, Melnick, & Sanvito, 
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familiarity with to-be-learned items (e.g., Shanks & Serra, 2014); how JOLs are framed (e.g., 
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metacognitive monitoring of past events on subsequent JOLs and study time (e.g., Hines et al., 
2009; Robinson, Hertzog, & Dunlosky, 2006). 
 
Age differences in JOL construction 
 
The question of interest for this study was whether there are age differences in multiplecue 
utilization when making JOLs. The existing literature on age differences in JOLs indicates age-
related invariance in the effects of different cues on JOLs, but only a few aging studies have 
evaluated concurrent influences of multiple cues. There is ample evidence that younger and older 
adults’ JOLs are influenced similarly by experimentally manipulated metacognitive cues and that 
there are few, if any, age differences in JOL accuracy (or resolution), as measured by within-
person correlations of JOLs with memory outcomes (e.g., Dunlosky & Hertzog, 2000; Hertzog et 
al., 2002, 2010; Robinson et al., 2006). With respect to multiple cue utilization, Hertzog et al. 
(2010) found that adults of all ages attended to their degree of success in using mediational 
strategies and assigned higher JOLs to well-encoded items for both related and unrelated items. 
 
However, such findings may not generalize to memory task performance monitoring, as required 
for MPT effects. Older adults are often less accurate in estimating aggregate recall outcomes 
within levels of experimental variables (e.g., Price, Hertzog, & Dunlosky, 2008), and are prone 
to high-confidence recognition memory errors (e.g., Dodson, Bawa, & Krueger, 2007; Hertzog & 
Touron, 2011; Shing, Werkle-Bergner, Li, & Lindenberger, 2009; Wong, Cramer, & Gallo, 
2012). Although Tauber and Rhodes (2012) and Serra and Ariel (2014) found that younger and 
older adults used the MPT heuristic similarly and appropriately to estimate subsequent JOLs in a 
cued recall task, it could be the case that attempting to monitor the large set of available cues in 
recognition memory tasks would exceed older adults’ diminished executive control and/or 
processing capacity (e.g., Hedden & Yoon, 2006; Salthouse, 2004). Furthermore, some aspects 
of performance monitoring may be impaired in old age, given evidence for age differences in 
resolution of CJs and estimated retrieval fluency (e.g., Craik & Hay, 1999; Hertzog et al., 2007; 
Hines et al., 2009). Hence, there are reasons to doubt older adults’ ability to monitor multiple 
cues successfully, especially when potent MPT effects could overshadow other available cues. 
 
Alternatively, Tauber and Rhodes (2012) noted that MPT likely relies not only on explicit 
recollections of actual test performance, but also on a set of implicit cues that operate in the 
absence of a high-quality recollection of the testing experience. Given agerelated declines in 
episodic, but not implicit, memory performance (e.g., Fleischman, Wilson, Gabrieli, Bienias, & 
Bennet, 2004; for reviews, see Light, 2000; Zacks, Hasher, & Li, 2000), older adults might 
manifest similar relations of metacognitive cues with JOLs, despite age differences in executive 
function and working memory capacity. 
 
Current hypotheses 
 
This study used a two study–test trial design in a yes–no associative recognition task (e.g., 
Naveh-Benjamin, 2000) to evaluate age differences in multiple cue influences on JOLs. Data on 
younger adults in this experiment were analyzed previously generating evidence of multiple-cue 
utilization in younger adults (Hertzog et al., 2013). The older adult data have not previously been 
reported. 
 
Our hypotheses derived from the multiple cue-utilization perspective. We hypothesized that 
older adults are capable of monitoring multiple cues when making JOLs on a second study–test 
trial. We predicted that, given the existing evidence for spared resolution and sensitivity of JOLs 
in old age, multiple cues would act simultaneously and independently for both younger and older 
adults when estimating Trial 2 JOLs, in patterns consistent with spared MPT accuracy in the 
presence of multiple-cue influences on JOLs. Critically, our specific empirical hypotheses were 
that (a) Trial 1 recognition CJs and estimated RTs would predict Trial 2 JOLs independently of 
Trial 1 recognition memory accuracy (i.e., MPT), and (b) variations in the fluency of self-paced 
study time at Trial 2 would also influence Trial 2 JOLs, given known encoding fluency effects 
that have been seen in single study–test trial tasks (e.g., Robinson et al., 2006). These effects, 
along with robust MPT effects in older adults, would provide compelling evidence for older 
adults’ ability to access multiple cues when making Trial 2 JOLs. Finally, we also expected 
consistency between Trial 1 and Trial 2 JOLs in both item-level and person-level effects, 
indicating consistency in perceived item difficulty and stable individual differences in both use 
of the JOL rating scale and levels of confidence about future learning. 
 
METHOD 
 
Design 
 
The experiment was a 2 (Age: Young, Old) × 2 (Study–Test Trial: 1, 2) mixed design, with age 
as a between-subjects independent variable and study–test trial as a withinsubjects repeated 
variable. 
 
Participants 
 
Fifty-one younger adults between the ages of 18 and 25 years (M = 19.2) participated, as did 36 
older adults who were between the ages of 60 and 75 years (M = 68.4). All younger adults were 
undergraduates at the Georgia Institute of Technology who received course credit for their 
participation. All older adults were recruited from the nearby community and were given an 
honorarium for their participation. All participants were pre-screened for basic health issues that 
could impede participation (e.g., diagnosed Parkinson’s disease or uncorrected visual 
impairments). Two cognitive tests were given in addition to the main experimental task to assess 
the similarity of basic information processing between our younger and older samples. The 
Shipley Institute of Living Scale– Revised vocabulary test (Zachary, 1986) was given to assess 
general crystallized abilities and is particularly relevant due to our experimental task involving 
encoding words (which benefits from knowing their meaning). The Digit–Symbol subtest of the 
Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale–Revised (WAIS-R, Wechsler, 1981) was also administered as 
a test of general fluid ability. This test involves participants being given a sheet of many rows of 
randomly ordered numbers (one through nine) under which they are to fill in an associated 
symbol (a key providing the unique associations is included on the top of the fill-in-the blank 
test). Following the 90-s fill-in-the blank interval, the key and response sheet are removed and 
participants are given another sheet with a single row of response boxes labeled with numbers 
one through nine and asked to fill in the appropriate symbol below each number using only their 
memory. Performance in both portions of the Digit–Symbol subtest benefits from learning the 
unique associations between the numbers and symbols quickly, an ability that serves as a proxy 
for general fluid intelligence. Participant characteristics are presented in Table 1. As would be 
expected given the vast literature on age differences in crystallized and fluid abilities, older 
adults outperformed younger adults on the Shipley vocabulary measure, whereas younger adults 
performed better on both components of the WAIS-R Digit–Symbol test. Extremely low outliers 
(greater than two standard deviations from the mean) would have been culled from the sample, 
but that was unnecessary. Outcomes pertaining to the other variables in Table 1 are discussed in 
the Results section. 
 
 
 
Materials and procedure 
 
Stimuli and procedural details were identical to those reported by Hertzog et al. (2013). One 
hundred twenty concrete nouns were used to construct 60 semantically unrelated word pairs 
(e.g., IVY-BIRD). Participants completed two study–test trials using the same set of 60 word 
pairs in both trials. Participants were told prior to beginning the first study trial that their 
memories of each word pair would be tested. Each study–test trial involved randomized item-
level study for each word pair that was terminated by participants pressing the spacebar. After 
ending study for each item, participants gave a JOL relating their ability to remember the word 
pair approximately 10 min later on a continuous scale from 0% to 100% confidence. 
 
Testing during both trials was also self-paced. Participants were presented with all 60 previously 
studied (i.e., intact) items in addition to 60 new (i.e., rearranged) items that were constructed 
from the same 120 nouns used to create the original items (sampled without replacement). For 
example, IVY-BARREL might have been a new item constructed for testing by rearranging 
words from the studied word pairs IVY-BIRD and BARREL-STAR. This procedure resulted in 
120 test items for which participants were asked to indicate by keypress if they had studied the 
presented word pair (YES) or if the word pair presented had not been studied previously (NO). 
After a Yes/No response was registered, participants gave a CJ for their recognition response 
scaled from 0% to 100%. Participants also gave an RT estimate for their Yes/No keypress using 
a computer mouse to move a slider along a continuous scale from 0 to 10 s. As the mouse 
moved, the computer displayed a numeric value to participants that was accurate to the nearest 
0.1 s. The order of collecting CJs and RT estimates was counterbalanced across participants who 
were randomly assigned to counterbalancing conditions to investigate possible reactivity due to 
the order of metacognitive judgments. No important interactions were found and data were 
analyzed after collapsing across counterbalancing conditions. Finally, it is unclear how one 
would map a Trial 1 rearranged-pair test item onto Trial 2 study behavior, given that rearranged 
test pairs draw words from two different paired-associate items. Moreover, consistent with past 
research (e.g., Cohn & Moscovitch, 2007; Hertzog & Touron, 2011), relationships between our 
variables of interest were considerably weaker for rearranged items at test. Hence the inclusion 
of data from Trial 1 test was restricted to intact word pairs in all analyses. 
 
Statistical procedure 
 
The relationships existing between the outcome variable Trial 2 JOL and predictor variables 
(specified below) were examined via multilevel modeling with within- and between-person 
centering of predictors in our models to account for both types of effects (see Enders & Tofighi, 
2007; and Singer, 1998). Within-person centering rescales each predictor independently as its 
deviation from that person’s mean value. For example, if a participant’s average RT is 2000 ms, 
an item-level RT of 1500 ms would be scaled as −500 ms. This type of centering allows for the 
evaluation of the influences of within person variation in cues predicts within-person variation in 
JOLs. In multilevel regression, these influences are called Level 1 regression effects. Between-
person centering involves calculating an average value for each predictor for each participant and 
calculating a difference score between the mean of each participant and the mean of the overall 
sample. For example, if the sample mean RT was 3000 ms, and a participant’s mean RT was 
2000 ms, the value would be rescaled to −1000 ms for every item-level response. Between-
person centering allows for the evaluation of individual differences in means on predictors and 
are referred to as Level 2 regression effects in multilevel models. 
 
Level 1 and Level 2 effects act independently from one another and can be used as predictors 
within the same model (Singer, 1998). This is advantageous because questions pertaining to 
within- and between-person variations in predictors can be investigated simultaneously. For 
example, questions like “does a faster recognition response for an item in Trial 1 predict a higher 
JOL for that item in Trial 2?” can be asked along with “do people who respond faster on average 
in Trial 1 have higher average memory confidence in Trial 2?” Examining only one type of 
question in isolation can lead to improper conclusions about the relationships between predictors 
and outcomes because Level 1 and Level 2 effects can operate in opposing directions (e.g., 
people may be more confident in items that they remember faster, but people who, on average, 
respond quickly are not necessarily more confident than those who respond more slowly). See 
Snijders and Bosker (2012) for a more detailed treatment of this topic. 
 
The multilevel regression models included the within- and between-person variables associated 
with every factor measured explicitly during the course of our experiment: participant age group 
(younger or older), study time from Trials 1 and 2, Trial 1 JOL, recognition accuracy (a binary 
measure), CJ, RT, and estimated RT. JOLs and CJs were scaled from 0% to 100% memory 
confidence, time-based measures were scaled in milliseconds, and age interaction terms were 
included for each variable to afford an age-based comparison of relationships between variables. 
 
Models were fit to our data using SAS PROC MIXED (Littell, Milliken, Stroup, & Wolfinger, 
2000), and our Type I error was set at α = .05 for all main effects and interactions. The F-tests 
associated with all fixed effects are reported, but only effects that met this standard are 
discussed. Relevant to our error criterion, it is appropriate to mention another benefit of 
examining our data via multi-level modeling as opposed to a more traditional measure, such as 
the gamma correlation (Nelson, 1984, 1996b). Murayama, Sakaki, Yan, and Smith (2014) found 
that the use of gamma correlations in a two-stage process to assess group-level differences 
(namely, by first computing participant-level correlations between JOLs and memory outcomes 
and then analyzing the derived statistics as dependent variables), can inflate the Type I error rate 
in the presence of one or more random effects (such as variance in item difficulty and individual 
differences in the effects of MPT cues on JOLs). Our models estimate fixed effects for each item, 
which controls for item difficulty effects and directly addresses this concern. Hertzog et al. 
(2013) found multiple random effects (i.e., individual differences) in analyzing the younger adult 
data presented here, and our analyses control for these effects, whereas the use of gamma 
correlations does not. Finally, when marginal distributions of the component variables are highly 
skewed, gamma correlations have high standard errors that are then ignored in the two-stage 
process, producing distorted standard errors for aggregate gammas. The multi-level modeling 
procedure produces appropriate asymptotic standard errors of estimate for all regression effects. 
 
RESULTS 
 
The models presented here focus on key predictors and Trial 2 JOL for both younger and older 
adults. Relevant means and standard deviations of the variables included therein can be found in 
Table 1. Briefly, older adults studied longer than did younger adults in order to reach a somewhat 
dissimilar level of recognition memory performance in Trial 1 (favoring younger adults). Older 
adults were generally less confident in their memories following both study and test experiences, 
although, like their younger counterparts, their initial underconfidence in Trial 1 was repaired 
following test, reflecting the benefits of the MPT heuristic and, possibly, the other potential JOL 
cues examined in detail below. Of particular note were response time estimates, which were 
discrepant from actual RT (assessed using the gamma correlations; see Nelson, 1984). Older 
adults’ estimates correlated less with actual RT (M = 0.32, SE = 0.03) than did those of younger 
adults (M = 0.41, SD = 0.03), d = .46, a medium-sized effect (Cohen, 1988). Given research 
showing that JOLs are more highly correlated with perceived rather than actual memory 
fluencies (e.g., Robinson et al., 2006), this discrepancy provides a good opportunity to determine 
whether our participants (especially older adults) were attuned to actual RT, estimated RT, or 
both when estimating JOLs. 
 
Multi-level model rationale 
 
We first defined an unconditioned model in which no effects were specified other than the 
intercept (see Table 2). This model served as a baseline for comparison with our other models 
because we used it to calculate pseudo-R2 values for each iteration by subtracting the residual 
(unexplained) variance for those models from the residual of the unconditioned model and 
dividing that amount by the residual of the unconditioned model. We were thus able to determine 
the benefit of adding specific components to the model in terms of the additional variance 
explained in item-level Trial 2 JOL. A second model included a random effect for the intercept, 
which allowed an examination of the influence of individual differences in average Trial 2 JOL 
(i.e., memory confidence). A third model added all fixed effects for the potential JOL cues 
specified above. A fourth model included the aforementioned effects in addition to a random 
effect of Trial 1 recognition accuracy. As discussed previously, prior research on MPT reported 
that a large proportion of the variation in subsequent memory confidence (relative to that of other 
potential cues) is based on whether an individual remembers the item-specific results of a prior 
memory test, so this effect is hypothesized to be of considerable importance. A reliable fixed 
effect would indicate that prior response accuracy was an important source of variation in Trial 2 
JOL. A reliable random effect would indicate that individuals varied in the extent to which they 
based JOLs on prior recognition accuracy. A fifth model also included a random effect for Trial 
1 CJs, which captured individual differences in this cue’s degree of influence on JOLs above and 
beyond differences in recognition memory accuracy itself. Model 6 retained the random effect of 
CJs but did not include the random effect of accuracy and served as a test of whether or not 
individual differences in Trial 1 recognition accuracy had a significant effect on the model’s 
explanatory power if we also included CJs. 
 
 
 
Multi-level model results 
 
Fit statistics pertaining to our models can be found in the top panel of Table 2. The following 
description of findings pertains only to older adult models, although the pattern of improvement 
in model fit resulting from the inclusion of specific random effects was similar between younger 
and older adults (see Hertzog et al., 2013 for further details regarding younger adult models). 
Model 2, which only included a random effect on intercept, accounted for approximately 47% of 
the variance in Trial 2 JOL and offered a better fit to the data than did our initial unconditioned 
model. Participants therefore differed reliably in their average level of learning confidence as 
assessed by Trial 2 JOLs. The explanatory power of the model increased considerably following 
the inclusion of all fixed effects, pseudo-R2 = .58. Smaller increases were found following the 
inclusion of random effects of Trial 1 recognition accuracy (pseudo- R2 = .60) and Trial 1 
recognition CJ (pseudo- R2 = .61). A small but statistically significant reduction in model fit 
(accounting for 1% of variance explained) resulted from the removal of the random effect of 
accuracy from the prior model. Individuals therefore varied with respect to the degree of 
emphasis placed on both recognition accuracy and CJs and the inclusion of both associated 
random effects in the model is therefore justified. The random effects covariance matrix for the 
accepted model, Model 5, are reported in Table 3. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The fixed effects solution for Model 5 is reported in Table 4, and the relevant F-tests are 
presented in Table 5. There was a robust main effect for Stimulus, indicating that items varied in 
their average JOL at Trial 2 (range: 54.31–84.58%). All other effects control for these average 
between-item differences in perceived degree of learning. The intercept was defined by the 
average JOL confidence of the older age group, given that age was dummy coded with a zero for 
older adults and one for younger adults. Therefore, each of the reported age-related effects in 
Table 4 can be interpreted as the differential consequence of being a younger adult. With that in 
mind, the average Trial 2 JOL for older adults was approximately 70%, t(168) = 18.73, P < .001. 
The age difference (approximately 4%, favoring younger adults) did not approach statistical 
reliability (P = .52, d = 0.14), indicating similar levels of post-study confidence in degree of 
learning for both age groups in Trial 2. This is useful because any age differences in factors 
influencing Trial 2 JOLs cannot be attributed to scale sensitivity differences (as might be the 
case if young and old responses tended to occupy different ranges of the JOL scale). 
 
 
 
Within-person JOL effects indicate the degree to which items vary in JOLs between Trial 1 and 
Trial 2. For each percentage increase in an item’s Trial 1 JOL, its Trial 2 JOL was increased by 
approximately 0.17% for older adults and approximately 0.10% for younger adults, t(5121) = 
−2.28, P < .001, d = 0.40, a medium-sized effect (Cohen, 1988). Given that mean item difficulty 
is controlled for by the Stimulus factor in the regression equation, this effect suggests that older 
adults’ JOL for each item was more stable across trials than younger adults’ item JOL. Individual 
differences in mean JOLs were also relatively stable across trials. For each percentage increase 
in a person’s average Trial 1 JOL, their average Trial 2 JOL increased by approximately 0.55%, 
t(88.9) = 3.97, P < .001, d = 0.84. A trend reflecting a smaller effect for younger adults (an 
increase of .22% in a person’s Trial 2 JOL for each percent increase in average Trial 1 JOL), also 
indicated more stability in post-study confidence for older adults, P = .07, d = 0.06, although the 
size of the effect was small (Cohen, 1988). Irrespective of this trend, a person’s average 
confidence in their initial learning was a robust predictor of their poststudy confidence in Trial 2 
for all participants.  
 
Despite some degree of stability, there was evidence of within-person and between-person 
changes in JOLs across the two study–test trials. As predicted by the MPT hypothesis, Trial 1 
recognition accuracy had a substantial impact on Trial 2 JOL, such that items with accurate Trial 
1 recognition responses were given 8.6% higher Trial 2 JOLs, t(69.8) = 5.30, P < .001, d = 1.27, 
than items that had not been correctly recognized. This MPT effect did not differ reliably 
between age groups, P = .12, d = 0.34. 
 
Several relationships emerged that showed MPT in the recognition memory domain to be 
broader than just a predictive relationship of memory success to subsequent JOLs. First and 
foremost, Trial 1 recognition test confidence predicted JOLs independently of recognition test 
accuracy. For each percent increase in an item’s Trial 1 CJ, the item’s Trial 2 JOL increased by 
approximately 0.13% (t(90.1) = 3.70, P < .001, d = 0.78). At the between-person level, each 
percent increase in a person’s average Trial 1 CJ, their average Trial 2 JOL increased by 
approximately 0.44% (t(87.7) = 2.56, P < .05, d = 0.55). This relationship emerged despite the 
substantial correlation of CJs with correct recognition responses (CJs for correct recognition 
responses were 37% higher than CJs for incorrect responses). 
 
Second, reliable random effects for recognition accuracy and CJs were found (see Table 3), 
indicating reliable individual differences in the relationships between these two variables and 
JOLs (irrespective of the mean-level correlations and age interactions otherwise reported). The 
correlation between each predictor and Trial 2 JOL was therefore higher for some participants 
than for others, which suggests that some participants weighed accuracy cues more heavily than 
CJs when constructing subsequent JOLs, and vice versa. Although it is possible that some 
participants increased their emphasis on both recognition accuracy and CJs at the expense of 
other measured predictors (e.g., actual or estimated RT), we did not detect the presence of any 
further individual differences (i.e., random effects), which would seem to indicate that this give-
and-take process was limited to recognition accuracy and CJs. 
 
Third, the participant-estimated latency of recognition test responses also influenced JOLs. For 
each perceived 1-s increase in item-level estimated Trial 1 recognition RT, the associated item-
level Trial 2 JOL decreased by approximately 0.63%, t(4819) = −1.33, P = .184, d = 0.04. Higher 
perceived recognition fluency was associated with an increase in subsequent JOL confidence for 
relevant items; however, unlike the pairing of CJs and objective recognition response accuracy, 
objective recognition response RT was not also a reliable predictor of subsequent JOLs in our 
model. A possible explanation for this discrepancy is that the influence of objective RTs on 
subsequent JOLs may have been mediated by other cues present in the model, thereby decreasing 
the direct association so much so that it was no longer a reliable predictor, whereas the effect of 
objective recognition response accuracy is so powerful that it remained in the model even after 
controlling for other cues with which it is correlated (e.g., CJs; see Hines et al., 2009, for an 
example of this phenomenon in a similar associative recognition task). 
 
In sum, the regression model indicated that multiple aspects of prior recognition test outcomes 
influenced Trial 2 JOLs, consistent with a multiple-cue utilization perspective. 
 
Perhaps the most critical evidence for multiple cue utilization involved the relationship of Trial 2 
encoding experiences on JOLs, independent of effects arising from Trial 1 recognition test 
experience. At the within-person level, Trial 2 self-paced study time also influenced Trial 2 
JOLs. For each 1-s increase in Trial 2 item-level study, the associated JOL decreased by 0.35%, 
t(5021) = −5.26, P < .001, d = 0.15. 
 
The most critical effect for evaluating age differences concerned the relation of Trial 2 study 
time to Trial 2 JOLs. Both younger and older adults exhibited higher confidence for their item 
memory as they invested more time studying each item at Trial 2, independently of the 
recognition test influences. However, we could not merely accept the null hypothesis of age 
equivalence given a statistical trend for an Age × Trial 2 Study Time interaction (P < .10). The 
trend reflects a larger decrease for subsequent JOLs for younger adults (.66%) than for older 
adults (.35%) for each additional second of study time, d = 0.09, 95% confidence interval [−0.02, 
0.64]. By Cohen’s (1988) standards, this is at best a small effect, and we conclude that any age 
difference in the influence of Trial 2 encoding fluency is relatively trivial. To make sure that an 
age difference at Trial 2 had not been suppressed by including Trial 1 Study Time in the model, 
we re-ran the model without the Trial 1 variable in the equation. The targeted Age × Trial 2 
Study Time interaction was not affected. 
 
Contrary to a resource-limitation hypothesis about age differences, both younger and older 
adults’ JOLs were influenced by the multiple cues we analyzed, as manifested in a general lack 
of age-related interactions. Even when trends toward age differences were present, the associated 
effect sizes were generally quite small. To clarify this point, the mean effect size for all age-
related interactions was 0.12 (SD = .14), ranging from 0.01 to 0.40. 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
The present study shows that both younger and older adults’ JOLs are influenced by multiple 
metacognitive cues that can act both simultaneously and independently from oneanother. Despite 
the fact that multiple cues influence JOLs, we saw little indication that older adults are deficient 
in multiple-cue utilization, consistent with earlier cued-recall evidence (e.g., Tauber & Rhodes, 
2012). One might expect older adults, who typically have been out of a formal educational 
setting for decades, to generate JOLs differently than our sample of younger adult students, who 
likely have more recent high-stakes experience in doing so. Instead, older adults showed similar 
MPT effects, and most critically, their encoding fluency at Trial 2 had an additional effect on 
JOLs – the evidence for multiple cue utilization. 
 
Regarding encoding fluency, this study shows that previous findings indicating age similarity in 
encoding fluency effects (Robinson et al., 2006) apparently extend to multitrial JOLs as well. 
Granted, we observed a trend for age differences in the magnitude of the effect of self-terminated 
study time on JOLs, but the associated effect size was small, and a reliable relationship of 
encoding fluency on Trial 2 JOLs was detected in both age groups. It is clear from our data that 
researchers typically find null effects of age on JOL estimation because younger and older adults 
use available cues in a similar way to construct JOLs. 
 
The analysis revealed an interesting pattern that underscores the value of using multilevel 
regression models to study multiple-cue influences on JOLs. Reliable individual differences 
(random effects) were found in the effects of both recognition accuracy and CJs on Trial 2 JOLs. 
This finding suggests the intriguing possibility that individuals vary in profiles of reliance (the 
subjective weight they placed upon) on recognition outcomes and CJs as cues when making 
JOLs. This finding warrants additional research to try to tease apart the conditions under which 
people may trade off utilization of these cues. For instance, it could be the case that individuals 
with higher proportions of strong, accurate recollective experiences in associative recognition 
attend more to recognition accuracy as a cue, whereas persons susceptible to high-confidence 
mis-recollections (Shing et al., 2009; Wong et al., 2012) show a greater reliance on CJs over 
recognition memory accuracy. Given older adults’ heightened susceptibility to this type of 
recognition memory illusion, it would be useful to import JOLs into tasks that manipulate false 
memory in recognition memory contexts (e.g., Fandakova, Shing, & Lindenberger, 2013; Jacoby 
& Rhodes, 2006) while attending explicitly to the measurement of both individual differences 
and person × task interaction effects. It is likely that age differences in retrieval monitoring 
accuracy could have differential impact on JOLs in tasks that produce high rates of memory 
illusions. For instance, Daniels, Toth, and Hertzog (2009) found that older adults’ JOLs were less 
predictive of subsequent recollection (remember versus know experiences) in a standard single-
trial yes–no recognition task (see also Soderstrom, McCabe, & Rhodes, 2012). 
 
Furthermore, some older adults (e.g., individuals with preclinical levels of mild cognitive 
impairment) may be more susceptible to these effects (Guerdoux, Dressaire, Martin, Adam, & 
Brouillet, 2012). Given the lack of age differences in the impact of recognition accuracy and CJs 
on subsequent JOLs in the present data, despite small differences in mean-level recognition 
memory accuracy and confidence, these effects appear to be minimal in the current sample. This 
could in part be a consequence of self-paced study, which may have facilitated more accurate 
recollective experiences in both age groups. 
 
The relative lack of age differences in how cues influence JOLs in this study fits well with the 
larger literature suggesting spared monitoring of encoding in old age (Hertzog & Dunlosky, 
2011; Hertzog et al., 2010). Given that we have extended this finding to the multiple-cue context 
of multi-trial learning, it seems that reduced-resources views of older adults’ JOL accuracy are 
not well supported by the present data. However, other explanations are possible that could still 
be reconciled with a reduced resources view of some aspects of metacognitive monitoring. As 
suggested by Tauber and Rhodes (2012), it could be the case that JOLs simply do not place 
strong demands on cognitive resources, being based more on relatively automatic or unconscious 
influences of cues on confidence (see also Shea et al., 2014). These influences could enable 
monitoring of multiple cues despite a primary focus of conscious attention on the explicit search 
for information about the past test as envisioned in the MPT heuristic (Serra & Ariel, 2014). 
Alternatively, age differences in monitoring accuracy might emerge when individuals are 
attempting to monitor learning online or in tasks with high concurrent demands on cognitive 
control. In effect, the measurement context of self-paced JOLs may remove processing demands 
during judgments that constrain active monitoring or monitoring accuracy in at least some task 
contexts. In any case, the present findings add to a picture of spared metacognitive monitoring of 
learning using standard JOL measurement techniques, despite strong age effects on what is being 
monitored – associative learning itself (e.g., Shing, WerkleBergner, Li, & Lindenberger, 2008; 
Old & Naveh-Benjamin, 2008). 
 
These results have potential implications for the use of metacognitive tasks in 
neuropsychological assessment of older adults. Although early work on aging, fluid intelligence, 
and working memory supported a generic argument that frontal lobe deterioration could be 
responsible for age-related cognitive decline (e.g., West, 1996), recent work in cognitive 
neuroscience indicates that differentiating sub-regions in prefrontal cortex is critical for 
understanding cognitive control, executive function, and metacognition (e.g., Fleming, Huijgen, 
& Dolan, 2012; Speer, Jacoby, & Braver, 2003). Research has shown that areas of anterior and 
medial prefrontal cortex, particularly ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC), are important 
substrates for supporting JOLs (Do Lam et al., 2012; Kao, Davis, & Gabrieli, 2005) and other 
metacognitive judgments (e.g., Chua, Schacter, & Sperling, 2009a). Older and younger adults 
activate similar brain regions when making metacognitive judgments (Chua, Schacter, & 
Sperling, 2009b), including vmPFC and anterior prefrontal cortex, although the latter may be 
more important for metacognition about percepts than memory (Fleming, Ryu, Golfinos, & 
Blackmon, 2014). Structural MRI evidence suggests relative sparing of vmPFC volume, 
compared to other frontal regions such as dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (e.g., Raz et al., 2005, 
2010). Most neuropsychological tests of frontal function, such as the Wisconsin card sorting test, 
focus on tasks that require working memory and task set maintenance and seem to be more 
dependent on intact dorsolateral prefrontal regions (e.g., Yuan & Raz, 2014) and are sensitive to 
age (Carp, Gmeindl, & Reuter-Lorenz, 2010; Salthouse & Davis, 2006; Toepper et al., 2014). 
Metacognitive judgments are also sensitive to frontal damage as revealed by neuropsychological 
tests (e.g., Bastin et al., 2012; Pannu, Kaszniak, & Rapcsak, 2005), but often without specificity 
as to localization of frontal damage. The fact that JOL accuracy is well preserved in old age in a 
number of associative memory tasks suggests that impairments in JOL accuracy, when they 
occur, would indicate likely pathology in vmPFC and related frontal network connections that 
are distinct from the lateral areas important for working memory and the control of memory 
encoding and retrieval (e.g., Badre & Wagner, 2007; Levy & Wagner, 2013). Future research 
could consider how task batteries that include metacognitive judgments like JOLs could help 
elucidate patterns of abnormal function in brain regions in older adults, differentiating 
consequences of localized frontal pathology from the more benign effects of normal aging on 
metacognitive monitoring. 
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